Privacy. That’s iPhone. Not your Mac.
cmdresearchI. Esquilichi and P. Redondo
Release 0x7
Topics: macos, privacy, wallet, passkit, disclosure691 words

Privacy. That’s iPhone. Not your Mac.

Abstract

Wallet passes and Apple Pay transactions sync to your Mac and sit in files any unentitled process can read.

Wallet passes and Apple Pay transaction records sync from your iPhone to your Mac and land in ~/Library/Passes. Nothing guards them. An ad-hoc-signed binary with no Wallet, PassKit, FinanceKit, or TCC entitlement reads the whole thing, including merchants, amounts, boarding passes, barcodes, names, ID numbers. It still works with SIP off, and passes from 2022 are still in there. Reported to Apple in June 2026, closed as Feedback Referral.

About the finding

Your iPhone and your Mac sync continuously under the same iCloud account, and Wallet is part of that sync. On the Mac it lands in two places:

~/Library/Passes/passes23.sqlite
~/Library/Passes/Cards/

passes23.sqlite is the shared PassKit store. Cards/ holds the pass bundles, each with its own pass.json.

We expected these to be gated under TCC, a private Wallet/PassKit/FinanceKit entitlement, or brokered access through passd with entitlement checks on the caller. Apple’s own behaviour suggests they consider this data sensitive: disable SIP and Wallet and Apple Pay stop working entirely, existing cards included.

Neither is true. There is no TCC check and no entitlement gate on either path.

So what?

Our PoC skips every supported access path — no passd, no PassKit APIs, no Full Disk Access, no privileged helper. Just open(), SQLite queries, and JSON parsing. It carries nothing:

Executable=.../passkit_wallet_dump_poc
Format=Mach-O thin (arm64)
CodeDirectory flags=0x2(adhoc)
Signature=adhoc
TeamIdentifier=not set

Ad-hoc signed, no team identifier, so basically the posture of any tool you build yourself or download. It returns not a subset of fields but the full record set, including the database schema, for every readable pass bundle and every vendor.

A transaction row, censored:

[payment_transaction row 4]
pid=
identifier=
service_identifier=
currency_code=EUR
amount=683900
subtotal_amount=
merchant_name=GLOVOAPP.COM

That was a food delivery order, seven days before the dump. And a boarding pass, straight out of its bundle:

barcodes.count=1
  barcode1.format=PKBarcodeFormatQR
  barcode1.message=
  barcode1.altText=
  barcode1.messageEncoding=iso-8859-1
style=boardingPass
  [headerFields]
    field1.key=gate
    field1.label=
    field1.value=07Oct 01:30
  [primaryFields]
    field1.key=origin
    field1.label=MADRID ESTACION SUR
    field1.value=01:30
    field2.key=destination
    field2.label=XXXXXX
    field2.value=06:30
  [secondaryFields]
    field1.key=name
    field1.label=Pasajero
    field1.value=XXXXXXX
  [auxiliaryFields]
    field1.key=locator
    field1.label=Localizador
    field1.value=XXXXXX
    field2.key=numBus
    field2.label=Bus
    field2.value=1
    field3.key=seat
    field3.label=Asiento
    field3.value=3
    field4.key=class
    field4.label=Clase
    field4.value=Comfort
  [backFields]
    field1.key=yourReservation
    field1.label=Tu Reserva
    field1.value=Nombre: XXXXXX\nDocumento: XXXXXXX\nOrigen: XXXXXX SUR\nDestino: XXXXXX\nFecha Salida: 07-10-22 01:30h\nFecha Llegada: 07-10-22 06:30h\nAsiento: 3

We censored this, but note what a real one holds: your name, your ID number, and the barcode, which is enough to reconstruct the ticket as-is.

Aggregate it and you have where someone pays and how much, which events they attend, which routes they take, and when. No interception, no credential theft. One file read.

It gets worse

SIP off doesn’t stop the sync. The test machine has had SIP disabled for two months as i’ve been doing some vphone-cli work on it. Wallet and Apple Pay are dead on that Mac as features, yet the data still arrives on disk and still reads out fine. The control that disables the feature does nothing about the data.

Nothing expires. We don’t know the retention threshold. We do know the device was wiped roughly six months before the dump, and the boarding pass above is from October 2022. Expired passes keep syncing between iPhone and Mac. What leaks isn’t recent activity, it’s a history.

The bounty

Closed as Feedback Referral: Apple’s team “has not been able to identify a security vulnerability.”

This isn’t a bug in code that exists; it’s a missing check on data Apple’s own SIP behaviour treats as privileged. Classify it however you like, the files are still readable.

Timeline

2026.06      Reported to Apple
2026.07      Closed, Feedback Referral: no security vulnerability identified
2026.11.05   Published
0x7 · macos, privacy, wallet, passkit, disclosure

Ismael Esquilichi & Pablo Redondo · Copyleft 2026